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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code §78-2-2(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue No. 1: Did Judge Hanson correctly conclude that defendant/appellant 
Johnson was judicially estopped from asserting, in this action, that he had a partnership 
interest in plaintiff/appellee Orvis' businesses when the undisputed facts demonstrated 
Johnson's prior sworn testimony in the SBA proceeding contradicted that position, the 
prior contradictory testimony was not a mistake, Johnson successfully maintained his 
prior contradictory position in the SBA proceeding to his benefit, and Orvis is in privity 
with the SBA? 
This issue was preserved. [R. at 2619-2631] 
This Court reviews Judge Hanson's grant of summary judgment and his legal 
conclusions for correctness. Young v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist. 2002 UT. 64. If 10. 52 
P.3d 1230. 
Issue No. 2(a): In the alternative, did Judge Hanson abuse his discretion in 
applying judicial estoppel to prevent Johnson from attempting to create an issue of 
material fact by asserting that Johnson owned a partnership interest in Orvis' businesses 
when that position contradicted Johnson's prior sworn testimony in the SBA proceeding, 
Johnson's previous contradictory testimony was not a mistake, Johnson successfully 
1 
maintained his previous contradictory position to his benefit, and Orvis is in privity with 
the SB A? 
This issue was preserved below. [R. at 2619-2631] 
This Court should review Judge Hanson's application of judicial estoppel under 
an abuse of discretion standard. See Alder v. Bayer Corp., 2002 UT. 115, \ 20, 61 P.3d 
1068, 1075-76; see also Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 270 F.3d 778, 782 
(9th Cir. 2001). 
Issue No. 2(b): If Judge Hanson did not abuse his discretion in applying judicial 
estoppel to prevent Johnson from attempting to create an issue of material fact by 
asserting that Johnson owned a partnership interest in Orvis' businesses, did Judge 
Hanson correctly conclude that summary judgment was appropriate when each of 
Johnson's claims and defenses required Johnson to prove he had a partnership interest in 
Orvis' businesses? 
This issue was preserved below. [R. at 2619-2631] 
This Court reviews Judge Hanson's grant of summary judgment for correctness. 
Young, 2002 UT 64, If 10. 
3. Did Judge Hanson correctly conclude that judicial estoppel does not require 
the party asserting it to be a party to the prior action or in privity with a party to the prior 
action? 
This issue was preserved. [R. at 2626] 
2 
This Court reviews Judge Hanson's legal conclusions for correctness. Young, 
2002 UT 64, If 10. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff/Appellee Jayson Orvis ("Orvis") filed a declaratory judgment action 
against defendant/appellant Jamis Johnson ("Johnson") in the Third District Court for the 
State of Utah on August 28, 2001, seeking a judgment that Johnson has no right, claim or 
interest in any business, enterprise or entity, relating to credit repair, in which Orvis has 
any ownership interest ("Orvis' businesses"). [R. at 1-14] Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
was assigned as the presiding judge. 
Johnson filed an answer to the complaint, a counterclaim against Orvis and a third 
party complaint against Deon Steckling, Sam Spendlove and Victor Lawrence. [R. at 20-
39] Each counterclaim against Orvis and every claim against the third party defendants 
was based on Johnson's assertion that he is a partner with Orvis in Orvis' businesses. 
[MJ1 
On August 30, 2002, third party defendants Victor Lawrence and Sam Spendlove 
filed a motion for summary judgment against Johnson, which Johnson opposed. [R. at 
1
 Orvis filed his answer to the counterclaims on November 21, 2001 denying the 
existence of any such partnership and each allegation of wrongdoing. [R. at 40-55] Third 
party defendants Lawrence and Spendlove filed their answers on December 20, 2001 and 
December 28, 2001, respectively, denying all allegations of wrongdoing. [R. at 62-72] 
Third party defendant Steckling filed his answer on February 22, 2002, denying all 
allegations of wrongdoing. [R. at 79-92] 
3 
1106-1108, 1114-1233, 1469-1493] After hearing oral argument, Judge Hanson granted 
the motion. Judge Hanson ruled, inter alia, that Johnson was judicially estopped from 
asserting he was a partner in Orvis' businesses based on Johnson's testimony, in another 
judicial proceeding, denying he had any interest in any partnership. [R. at 1849-1851, 
1924-1933] Johnson never appealed that summary judgment, the time for appeal has 
long since passed, and that judgment is not the subject of this appeal. [R. at 2638-2639] 
On March 30, 2004, Orvis filed a motion for summary judgment, on the ground of 
judicial estoppel, on Orvis' claims against Johnson and on Johnson's counterclaims 
against Orvis. [R. at 1940-1951, 1957-1990] Third party defendant Deon Steckling 
joined in the motion. [R. at 1991-1999]2 Johnson, who was represented by attorney Joe 
Cartwright, opposed the motion. [R. at 2242-2515; R-2708 at 1] 
After hearing oral argument on August 9, 2004, Judge Hanson issued a decision 
on October 20, 2004, granting Orvis' motion for summary judgment on the ground of 
judicial estoppel. [R. at 2607, 2619-2622] On November 23, 2004, Judge Hanson 
entered a final Judgment in favor of Orvis and against Johnson on Orvis' complaint and 
Johnson's counterclaim, and in favor of Steckling and against Johnson on Johnson's 
2
 Based on Johnson's opening brief, Johnson has not appealed or requested 
reversal of Judge Hanson's grant of Steckling's motion for summary judgment. In the 
event the Court determines otherwise, this brief is also filed on behalf of Deon Steckling. 
[Johnson Br. caption & at vii-viii] 
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third party complaint. [R. at 2628-2632] Judge Hanson, on the same day, entered 
findings and conclusions. [R. at 2623-2629] 
On December 21, 2004, Johnson appealed the Judgment. [R. at 2638-2639] 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Johnson, In The Prior SB A Proceeding, Denied Under Oath That He Had 
Any Interest In Any Partnership, Any LLC Or The Lexington Law Firm; 
Orvis Purchased And Became The Assignee Of The SB A Judgment After 
The SBA Could Not Collect From Johnson On The Judgment. 
On September 14, 1995, Johnson was sued by the Small Business Administration 
("SBA") in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, 
Civil No. 2:95-CV-838J. A $260,000 judgment was entered against Johnson in that case 
on September 29, 1997. [R. at 2381] 
The SBA, in post judgment supplemental proceedings in that action, took 
Johnson's deposition on November 17, 1999, to identify assets to satisfy its judgment. 
[R. at 2389-2484] Before answering any questions, Johnson was sworn in by the court 
reporter, and he swore to truthfully answer each of the questions. [R. at 2484] At the 
time his deposition was taken, Johnson was a licensed attorney in Utah who had 
practiced law for a number of years.3 [R. at 2401, 2413] 
In his deposition, Johnson denied, under oath, that he had any interest in any 
partnership or limited liability company: 
3
 Sometime after his deposition was taken, Johnson was disbarred on unrelated 
matters. [R. at 2412-2413; Johnson Br. at 25] 
5 
Q: Do you have any interest in any partnerships? 
A: No. . . .4 
Q. Any interest in any limited liability companies? 
A. No.. . . 
[R. at 1983-1984] 
At his deposition, Johnson was specifically asked questions relative to one of the 
credit repair business entities - Lexington Law Firm - with which Mr. Orvis is involved. 
Johnson denied, under oath, that he had any interest in that business: 
A. . . . Lexington Law Firms was in my name, but since that time and with 
my bar problem, I have completely relinquished any interest. They paid 
me a little, made my payment, and I resigned. Now, it's listed as an 
assumed name by Jamis Johnson, they're going to have to go in and change 
that. But, you know, they're operating now without me. 
[R. at 1979-1980 (emphasis added)] Johnson did not change any of that testimony, either 
during the deposition or after his testimony was transcribed. [R. at 2483-2484] 
The SB A, as a result of Johnson's sworn testimony that he had no interest in any 
partnerships or LLC or any other asset, as well as Johnson's wife's sworn testimony, did 
4
 The remainder of Johnson's answer to that question is irrelevant to the issue of 
judicial estoppel because it in no way limits or qualifies his denial of having any interest 
in any partnership, which would include any partnership interest he claims in this case in 
Orvis' businesses. The remainder of his answer was: "I mean, you know, often I'll have 
a joint venture with someone, but I don't have a partnership or set up a partnership or an 
LLC. You know, if I get a deal I say, Hey, do you want to do this deal together? We'll 
go up to Summit County and buy a lot." 
6 
not identify any asset to execute upon to satisfy its judgment against Johnson. [R. at 
2389-2484]. The SB A judgment remained uncollected, and the SB A sold and assigned 
the judgment to a third party - All Star Financial, LLC - for a fraction of its face value 
on August 8, 2001. [R. at 2513] On August 11, 2001, All Star Financial, LLC sold and 
assigned the SBA judgment to Orvis. [Id.] 
2. Orvis Filed This Action Against Johnson For A Declaratory Judgment That 
Johnson Has No Interest Right Or Claim In Orvis" Businesses; Johnson, In 
Contradiction Of His Sworn SBA Testimony. Claims He Has A 
Partnership Interest In Orvis' Businesses. 
Orvis, on August 28, 2001, filed a declaratory judgment action against Johnson 
seeking a judgment that Johnson has no right, claim or interest in any of Orvis' 
businesses. [R. at 1-14] Johnson responded to the complaint with an answer, 
counterclaim and third party complaint against Victor Lawrence, Deon Steckling and 
Sam Spendlove. [R. at 20-39] While Johnson used different labels for his numerous 
legal claims against Orvis and the third party defendants, every one of those claims was 
based upon Johnson's assertion that he and Orvis are partners in Orvis' businesses. [R. 
at 28-38] 
On March 30, 2004, Orvis filed a motion for summary judgment against Johnson, 
both with regard to Orvis' claims and Johnson's counterclaims against Orvis, on the 
ground of judicial estoppel. Orvis argued that Johnson was judicially estopped from 
claiming a partnership with Orvis in Orvis' businesses in this action because Johnson had 
7 
denied owning any interest in any partnership, LLC or Lexington Law Firm in his sworn 
testimony in the SB A proceeding. [R. at 1940-1951, 1957-1990] 
Johnson's lawyer, two months later on May 27, 2004, filed a 23 page opposition 
to Orvis' motion. [R. at 2242-2515, 2608-2618] Johnson opposed the motion on three 
basic grounds: (1) Johnson's SB A testimony is not inconsistent with his position in this 
case that he is a partner with Orvis in Orvis' businesses; (2) if there is any ambiguity in 
Johnson's SB A testimony, there is a material issue of fact as to whether Johnson's 
testimony and his position in this case are inconsistent; and (3) the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel does not apply here. [R. at 2257-2264] 
The only record Johnson filed in opposition to Orvis' motion for summary 
judgment was his Affidavit filed with the opposition, and Corrections Supplementing 
Affidavit of Jamis Johnson, filed on August 11, 2004. [R. at 2266-2515, 2608-2618] 
The only record relative to the issue of whether Johnson's SB A testimony was 
inconsistent with his position in this case was: (1) Johnson's actual SB A testimony and 
(2) Johnson's statement in his affidavit that: "In his deposition, Jamis Johnson 
accurately disclosed the information requested by the SB A," [Tr. at 2274] including in 
his testimony regarding his "Interests in any partnerships - P.30 lines 16-25 and P. 31 
lines 1-24" - the testimony at issue. [R. at 2275] There was no other record relative to 
that issue - Johnson's first two points of opposition. 
8 
Johnson's third argument - that the doctrine of judicial estoppel did not apply -
was based on the assertion that, under Utah law, Orvis was required to prove three 
elements, and Orvis had failed to do so. [R. at 2262-2264] Specifically, Johnson 
asserted: 
Under Utah law, three elements must be shown before a court may 
judicially estop a litigant from denying a position taken in a prior 
judicial proceeding: (1) The prior proceeding must be between "the 
same person's or their privies"; (2) it must involve "the same subject 
matter"; and (3) the prior position must have been "successfully 
maintained." 
[R. at 2262] Johnson did not file or rely on any record to support his position that 
"[n]one of these elements is present here." [R. at 2263] 
There was, however, undisputed evidence before Judge Hanson relative to 
Johnson's argument that judicial estoppel did not apply. That evidence included: (1) 
Johnson admitted in his affidavit that Orvis and the SBA were privies - "Orvis has, as 
the assignee of the SBA judgment..." [R. at 2281, ^ 60; R. at 2280, ffif 52, 54; R. at 
2513];5 (2) The post-judgment supplementary proceedings in the SBA action was a 
proceeding to determine whether Johnson had any assets, including any interest in any 
partnership; this action is an action to determine whether Johnson has a partnership 
interest in Orvis' businesses; [R. at 1-14, 20-55, 2381, 2389-2484] and (3) the SBA did 
5
 There was no record as to the source of the money Orvis used to purchase the 
judgment. In particular, there was no evidence that Orvis used money from the "alleged 
partnership" to purchase the SBA judgment. There also was no record or legal authority 
demonstrating that Orvis violated any legal duty to Johnson by buying the SBA judgment. 
9 
not execute on the partnership interest Johnson, in this action, claims he has in Orvis' 
businesses because Johnson testified under oath in the SBA proceeding that he had no 
interest in any partnership.6 
Johnson never raised as an issue that, under Utah law, detrimental reliance was an 
essential element of judicial estoppel. [R. at 2242-2265] Johnson likewise never raised 
as an issue that, under Utah law, the prior testimony had to be in bad faith as opposed to 
a mistake. [Id.] 
Johnson, furthermore, at no time raised an issue relative to or challenged Judge 
Hanson's impartiality. Nor did Johnson present any evidence of any bias.7 
3. Judge Hanson Granted Orvis' Motion For Summary Judgment Based On 
Judicial Estoppel. 
Judge Hanson heard oral argument on Orvis' motion for summary judgment on 
6
 Johnson makes numerous assertions regarding his wife's involvement in this 
matter. However, Judge Hanson ruled that Johnson's wife DaNell Johnson was not a 
proper party to the litigation because she had not been properly joined. [R. at 1845-1847] 
Johnson had over one year to add her as a party before Orvis filed his motion for 
summary judgment but never did so. He also never appealed Judge Hanson's ruling. 
Moreover, in his SBA testimony, Johnson never testified that DaNell Johnson received 
money from a partnership Johnson had with Orvis or in which she had a beneficial 
interest. [R. at 2480-2482] Finally, even if DaNell Johnson was a party, her claim would 
also be barred by judicial estoppel because she, at most, only had whatever partnership 
interest Johnson could claim. 
7
 Johnson spends a great percentage of his brief arguing that third party defendant 
Victor Lawrence engaged in wrongful conduct. Those arguments and assertions are 
irrelevant to this appeal. Judge Hanson granted summary judgment to Lawrence in June 
2003. [R. at 1849-1857; 1924-1933] Johnson never appealed that judgment. Orvis' 
counsel does not and has never represented Lawrence in this litigation and obviously 
cannot and will not defend Mr. Lawrence. 
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August 9, 2004, and took the matter under advisement. [R. at 2607] On October 20, 
2004, Judge Hanson entered a Minute Entry granting Orvis' motion for summary 
judgment on the ground of judicial estoppel. [R. at 2619-2622] In that decision, Judge 
Hanson held: 
Mr. Johnson is judicially estopped from asserting that he had an 
interest in a partnership where he, in a separate proceeding under 
oath, testified he had none. There is no question of mistake. Mr. 
Johnson testified as he did, so as to avoid collection efforts from the 
Small Business Administration. The principle of judicial estoppel 
prohibits Mr. Johnson from in this later action now asserting a 
different position. 
[R. at 2620] 
On November 23, 2004, Judge Hanson entered a final Judgment in favor of Orvis 
and against Johnson on Orvis' claims and Johnson's counterclaims. The Judgment 
declared that "Defendant has no right, claim or interest in any business, enterprise or 
entity, relating to credit repair, in which plaintiff has any ownership interest." [Id. at 
2631] [R. at 2630-2632] Judge Hanson's decision and the Judgment were supported, 
not only by the record, but by findings and conclusions he entered the same day as the 
Judgment. [R. at 2623-2629] 
Judge Hanson's decision and the Judgment were based on undisputed facts, 
including the following material undisputed facts: 
(1) The SB A took Johnson's deposition in post-judgment supplemental 
proceedings in United States of America v. Jamis Johnson, 2:95-CV-838J, in the United 
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States District Court for the District of Utah, on November 17, 1999, to identify assets on 
which it could execute to collect its judgment against Johnson. [R. 2627, f f 4-5] At his 
deposition, Johnson, under oath, denied he had any interest in any partnership, LLC, or 
Lexington Law Firm. [R. at 2627-2628, f 5] 
(2) Johnson's denial of any interest in any partnership, LLC or Lexington Law 
Firm was not a mistake. "Johnson testified as he did so as to avoid collection efforts by 
the SBA." [R. at 2627, ^ 5] 
(3) The SB A, after deposing Johnson and his wife, did not identify any asset to 
satisfy its judgment; it never collected on the judgment; and the SBA assigned the 
judgment to a third party on August 11, 2001. [R. at 2625, f^ 6] 
(4) On August 11, 2001, the third party assigned the SBA judgment to Orvis. 
[R. at 2625,17] 
(5) Johnson in this action, in his counterclaim against Orvis and in his third 
party complaint, claims that a partnership has existed between him and Orvis since 
before his SBA deposition was taken, and, that based on his partnership interest, he is 
entitled to partnership proceeds from intellectual property lease payments and consulting 
fees paid to Orvis by various credit repair businesses, including an entity called the 
Lexington Law Firm. [R. at 2624, ^ 2-3] 
Judge Hanson's Conclusions of Law included: 
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(1) "The principle of judicial estoppel prohibits Johnson from asserting a 
different position in this later action from the position to which he testified under oath in 
the SBA case." [R. at 2626, f 1] 
(2) "Judicial estoppel does not require that the parties to the prior and present 
litigation be the same." [R. at 2626, Tf 2] 
(3) "Even if Utah law requires that the parties to the prior and present 
proceedings be the same in order for judicial estoppel to apply, such is not determinative 
in this case because Orvis, having purchased and having been assigned the judgment 
owned by the SBA, is in privity with the SBA." [R. at 2626, % 3] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court should affirm Judge Hanson's Judgment in favor of Orvis and against 
Johnson. Judge Hanson correctly held that Johnson is judicially estopped in this action 
from contradicting his earlier sworn testimony in the SBA supplemental proceeding that 
he did not have any interest in any partnerships. Judge Hanson considered the proper 
factors to determine whether to apply judicial estoppel - whether the prior testimony and 
subsequent position are contradictory, whether the prior position was successfully 
maintained, and whether the prior position was a mistake. There were no disputed issues 
of material fact relative to those factors. The undisputed facts demonstrated Johnson's 
prior sworn testimony contradicted his position that he has a partnership interest in 
Orvis' businesses, that Johnson successfully maintained his prior contradictory position 
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for his economic benefit, and that Johnson's prior contradictory sworn testimony was not 
a mistake. The application of judicial estoppel here, moreover, furthers the purpose for 
judicial estoppel - safeguarding the integrity of the judicial process. To reverse Judge 
Hanson's decision would permit Johnson to do exactly what judicial estoppel was 
designed to prevent - it would allow a litigant to use the courts to perpetrate a fraud. 
Johnson, in addition to being wrong about the issues he preserved for appeal, 
attempts to raise issues for the first time on appeal to convince the court to reverse Judge 
Hanson. These newly raised issues include: (1) judicial estoppel requires detrimental 
reliance; (2) judicial estoppel requires bad faith; and (3) Judge Hanson was biased 
against Johnson. As a matter of law, Johnson has waived those as a basis for appeal. In 
any event, Johnson's positions on those issues are without merit. 
ARGUMENT 
I. COURTS BALANCE RELEVANT FACTORS TO DETERMINE 
WHETHER TO APPLY THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL 
ESTOPPEL. THOSE FACTORS DO NOT INCLUDE MUTUALITY OF 
PARTIES. DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE OR SAME SUBJECT 
MATTER. 
Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine established by courts as a separate and 
distinct doctrine from other estoppel doctrines such as equitable estoppel and collateral 
estoppel. Judicial estoppel is the equitable doctrine that "prevents a party from seeking 
judicial relief by offering statements inconsistent with its own sworn statement in a prior 
judicial proceeding." Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson. 923 P.2d 
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1366, 1371 (Utah 1996). The purpose of that doctrine, unlike the other estoppel 
doctrines, is "to protect the integrity of the judicial process . . . by prohibiting parties 
from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment." New 
Hampshire v. Maine. 532 U.S. 742. 749-50 (2001) (citations omitted); accord Johnson v. 
Lindon City Corp.. 405 F.3d 1065. 1068-70 (10th Cir. 2005); Jones. Waldo. 923 P.2d at 
1371 ("The purpose of judicial estoppel is to uphold the sanctity of oaths, thereby 
safeguarding the integrity of the judicial process from conduct such as knowing 
misrepresentation or fraud on the court.") (citations omitted). 
Utah law is unsettled as to what factors a court should consider to determine 
whether to apply judicial estoppel. The Utah Supreme Court's 1942 articulation of 
judicial estoppel is contrary to the overwhelming majority of courts' position of what 
factors are relevant in a judicial estoppel analysis. Later Utah Supreme Court cases have 
indicated Utah's rule may, in fact, be in accord with the majority position. 
This case presents the opportunity for this Court to clarify what the rule in Utah is 
relative to judicial estoppel. 
A. Tracy Loan's Statement Of Judicial Estoppel Is A Mixture Of Equitable 
Estoppel Collateral Estoppel And Res Judicata. 
In 1942, the Utah Supreme Court in Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v. Openshaw Inv. 
Co.. 132 P.2d 388 (Utah 1942). set forth and followed the rule for judicial estoppel that it 
believed was the majority view at the time: 
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A person may not to the prejudice of another person deny any 
position taken in a prior judicial proceeding between the same 
persons or their privies involving the same subject-matter, if such 
prior position was successfully maintained. 
132 P.2d at 390.8 Those factors are essentially a blend of the elements required for 
equitable estoppel, collateral estoppel and res judicata. Nunley v. Westakes Casing 
Servs.. Inc.. 1999 UT 100. If 34. 989 P.2d 1077. 1088; Richards v. Hodson. 485 P.2d 
1044^ 1046 (Utah 1971). 
Tracy Loan expressly rejected what it considered the minority position on judicial 
estoppel. That position was: 
In the absence of mistake as to facts, inadvertence or 
misapprehension as to the law, one who takes a positive position in 
one case as to the facts, will be estopped to deny or alter such 
position or statement in a subsequent action although the parties may 
not be the same. 
132 P.2d at 391. Tracy Loan rejected that position, while acknowledging it "is based on 
public policy, [is] not predicated on any prejudice to an adverse party [, and is] a punitive 
rule to deter a litigant from testifying falsely, and thereby us[ing] the judicial system to 
perpetrate fraud." Id 
8
 The federal cases on which Tracy Loan relied have since changed their position 
and have now adopted what Tracy Loan considered the minority rule which it rejected. 
See New Hampshire v. Maine. 532 U.S. 742 (2001); compare Gait v. Phoenix Indemnity 
Co.. 120 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1941) with Konstantinidis v. Chen. 626 F.2d 933 (D.C. Cir. 
1980); compare Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co.. 99 F.2d 9 (1st 
Cir. 1938) with Alternative Svs. Concepts. Inc. v. Svnopsvs. Inc.. 374 F.3d 23. 30-32 (1st 
Cir. 2004). 
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B. The Overwhelming Majority Of Courts Today Have Adopted The Position 
Rejected By Tracy Loan. 
The position and policy rejected by Tracy Loan is now the law in the 
overwhelming majority of federal and state courts. Those courts, moreover, have 
recognized that "the circumstances under which judicial estoppel may appropriately be 
invoked are probably not reducible to any general formulation of principle" but that 
"several factors typically inform the decision whether to apply the doctrine in a particular 
case." New Hampshire. 532 U.S. at 750. 
The United States Supreme Court, as well as the majority of courts, has utilized 
the following factors to determine whether judicial estoppel applies: 
(1) whether a party's later position is "clearly inconsistent" with its 
earlier position. 
(2) whether the party has succeeded in persuading a court to accept 
that party's earlier position, so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent 
position in a later proceeding could create "the perception that either the 
first or the second court was misled." 
(3) whether the party attempting to assert an inconsistent position 
"would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the 
opposing party if not estopped." 
532 U.S. at 750-51. Those factors are not inflexible requirements or the only relevant 
factors. Id. at 751. Indeed, judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine to be invoked by a 
court at its discretion. Id. at 750. 
However, the overwhelming majority of courts have squarely held that mutuality 
of the parties is not a relevant factor because judicial estoppel is designed to protect the 
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judicial system, not the interests of individual litigants. See, e.g.. Hall v. GE Plastic 
Pacific PTE Ltd.. 327 F.3d 391. 399 (5th Cir. 2003) (privity is not required under judicial 
estoppel because judicial estoppel is "'intended to protect the judicial system, rather than 
the litigants."') (citation omitted); Johnson v. Si-Cor Inc.. 28 P.3d 832. 835 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2001) ("The majority of courts that have considered the matter have concluded that 
privity of the parties, reliance, and prejudice - generally recognized elements of estoppel 
- are inapplicable to the doctrine of judicial estoppel."); Ryan Operations G.P. v. 
Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co.. 81 F.3d 355. 360 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[T]he purpose of the 
judicial-estoppel doctrine militates against the imposition of a privity requirement. 
Judicial estoppel 'is intended to protect the courts rather than the litigants.' . . . Our 
conclusion that privity is not required for application of judicial estoppel accords with 
the majority view.") (citation omitted).9 
9
 Ortlieb v. Hudson Bank. 312 F. Supp. 2d 705. 711 (E.D. Pa. 2004) ("It is not 
required that the litigant arguing in favor of [judicial] estoppel was a party to the prior 
proceeding nor that he or she was in privity with a party to that proceedings"; "The 
integrity of the court is affronted by the inconsistency notwithstanding the lack of identity 
of those against whom it is asserted.'") (citation omitted); Cannon-Stokes v. Potter. 2004 
WL 407014. at *4 (N.D. 111. March 4. 2004) ("'Because the purpose of judicial estoppel is 
to prevent a party from playing fast and loose with the courts, rather than to protect 
litigants, under the prevalent view there generally is no need to demonstrate . . . privity of 
the adverse party.'") (citation omitted); Whiteacre Partnership v. Biosignia. Inc.. 591 
S.E.2d 870. 881-82 (N.C. 2004) (judicial estoppel does not require "mutuality of parties" 
and may be "invoked by a stranger to the transaction where the prior position was 
asserted."); Ex parte First Alabama Bank. 883 So.2d 1236. 1243 (Ala. 2003) ("'[Judicial 
estoppel, unlike the other estoppel doctrines, does not require privity between the parties 
in the two proceedings. . . . Indeed, the doctrine has nothing to do with other parties to the 
suit. Rather, it is the very inconsistency that judicial estoppel will not tolerate.'") 
18 
(citations omitted); Newfield Exploration Co. v. Applied Drilling Technology, Inc., 2003 
WL 23253. at *6 (E.D. La. Jan. 2. 2003) ("The more prevalent view in this and other 
circuits is that for judicial estoppel to apply, both parties need not be the same in the first 
and second proceedings."); Otis v. Arbella Mutual Ins. Co.. 2003 WL 21385792. at *3 
(Mass. Super. Apr. 18, 2003) ("Judicial estoppel is broader: 'a party in the second action 
may rely on judicial estoppel, even though not a party in the first action.'") (citation 
omitted); Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex. Inc.. 291 F.3d 1282. 1286 (11th Cir. 2002) ("The 
doctrine of judicial estoppel protects the integrity of the judicial system, not the litigants; 
therefore, numerous courts have concluded, and we agree, that '[wjhile privity . . . [is] 
often present injudicial estoppel cases, [it] is not required.55') (citation omitted); 
Montrose Medical Group v. Bulger. 243 F.3d 773. 779 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001) (privity, while a 
prerequisite for application of equitable estoppel, is "not required for invocation of 
judicial estoppel.55); In re Estate of Loveless. 64 S.W.3d 564. 578 (Tex. App. 2001) 
("[E]quitable estoppel arises only in favor of the parties to the first suit and those in 
privity with them, while judicial estoppel may be invoked by a stranger to the original 
proceeding.55); International Billing Services. Inc. v. Emigh. 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 532. 542 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000) ("'Unlike equitable estoppel, judicial estoppel may be applied even 
if. . . privity does not exist555) (citation omitted); Wabash Grain. Inc. v. American Car & 
Foundry Indus.. Inc.. 700 N.E.2d 234. 237-38 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) ("'[In contrast to 
judicial estoppel], equitable estoppel exists 'only as between the same parties or those in 
legal privity with them.5 . . . The purpose of judicial estoppel is to protect the integrity of 
the judicial process rather than to protect litigants from allegedly improper conduct by 
their adversaries.55) (citation omitted); Vowers and Sons. Inc. v. Strasheim. 576 N.W.2d 
817. 824 (Neb. 1998) ("'[Jjudicial estoppel may be applied even if . . . privity does not 
exist.555) (citation omitted); Johnson v. Du Page Airport Authority. 644 N.E.2d 802. 807 
(111. App. Ct. 1994) ("[Judicial estoppel] may be applied despite the lack of. . . privity.55); 
State v. Fleming. 510 N.W.2d 837. 841 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (judicial estoppel, unlike 
equitable estoppel, does not require privity; "'This distinction reflects a difference in 
policy objectives: in contrast to equitable estoppel's concentration on the integrity of the 
parties5 relationship to each other, judicial estoppel focuses on the integrity of the judicial 
process.555) (citation omitted); McMaster v. Teledyne Pine. 838 F. Supp. 331. 334 (E.D. 
Mich. 1993) (judicial estoppel, unlike equitable estoppel, does not require privity; "This 
distinction reflects the difference in the policies served by the two rules. Equitable 
estoppel protects litigants from less than scrupulous opponents. Judicial estoppel, 
however, is intended to protect the integrity of the judicial process.555) (quoting Edwards 
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.. 690 F.2d 595. 598 (6th Cir. 1982)); Monterey Dev. Corp. v. 
Lawyers Title Ins. Co.. 4 F.3d 605. 609 (8th Cir. 1993) ("Judicial estoppel prevents a 
person who states facts under oath during the course of a trial from denying those facts in 
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The overwhelming majority of courts have likewise held that detrimental reliance 
is not a relevant factor in a judicial estoppel analysis. Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex. Inc.. 
291 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 2002) (detrimental reliance not required because "courts 
have concluded that since the doctrine is intended to protect the judicial system, those 
asserting judicial estoppel need not demonstrate individual prejudice."); Lowery v. 
Stovall 92 F.3d 219. 223 n.3 (4th Cir. 1996) ("[A] party asserting judicial estoppel does 
not have to prove detrimental reliance because judicial estoppel is designed to protect the 
integrity of the courts rather than any interests of the litigants." ); Konstantinidis v. Chen, 
626 F.2d 933. 937 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("'Judicial estoppel/ on the other hand, although 
otherwise similar to the equitable estoppel rule against inconsistency, does not require 
proof of privity, reliance, or prejudice... . This distinction reflects a difference in policy 
objectives: in contrast to equitable estoppel's concentration on the integrity of the 
a second suit, even though the parties in the second suit may not be the same as those in 
the first."); State v. St. Cloud. 465 N.W.2d 177, 180 (S.D. 1991) ("Unlike collateral 
estoppel or equitable estoppel, judicial estoppel [does not require] privity between parties 
in the two proceedings . . . 'The gravamen of judicial estoppel is not privity, reliance, or 
prejudice. Rather it is the intentional assertion of an inconsistent position that perverts 
the judicial machinery.5") (citation omitted); Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. National Labor 
Relations Board. 911 F.2d 1214. 1220 (6th Cir. 1990) ("Judicial estoppel is not bounded 
by the limits of mutuality and finality that protect the parties in collateral estoppel."); 
Konstantinidis v. Chen. 626 F.2d 933. 937 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (privity is not required under 
judicial estoppel; "This distinction reflects a difference in policy objectives: in contrast to 
equitable estoppel's concentration on the integrity of the parties' relationship to each 
other, judicial estoppel focuses on the integrity of the judicial process.") (citing to 
Hamilton v. Zimmerman, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 39 (1857)). 
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parties' relationship to each other Judicial estoppel focuses on the integrity of the 
judicial process.").10 
10
 Friend v. Friend 2004 WL 1875603. at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 23. 2004) 
("The doctrine of judicial estoppel is designed to protect the court, and not the litigants. 
[Thus, detrimental reliance need] not be present as would be the case in equitable or 
collateral estoppel."); In re Bilstat. Inc.. 314 B.R. 603. 610 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004) 
("[Detrimental reliance, while it is an element of equitable estoppel, need not be shown 
to establish judicial estoppel."); Roberts v. Alcoa. 811 N.E.2d 466. 475 (111. App. Ct. 
2004) (detrimental reliance not required because "the purpose of judicial estoppel is to 
protect the integrity of the judicial process rather than to protect the parties to a case from 
improper conduct by their adversaries."); In the Matter of Superior Crewboats. Inc.. 374 
F.3d 330. 334 (5th Cir. 2004) ("Importantly, because judicial estoppel is designed to 
protect the judicial system, not the litigants, detrimental reliance by the party opponent is 
not required."); Cannon-Stokes v. Potter. 2004 WL 407014. at *4 (N.D. 111. March 4. 
2004) (detrimental reliance not required as the "'doctrine of judicial estoppel protects the 
integrity of the judicial system, not the litigants.'") (citation omitted); Whiteacre 
Partnership v. Biosignia. Inc.. 591 S.E.2d 870. 882 (N.C. 2004) (noting "absence of a 
requirement of detrimental reliance on the part of the party invoking [judicial] estoppel"); 
Ex parte First Alabama Bank. 883 So.2d 1236. 1243 (Ala. 2003) (detrimental reliance not 
an essential element of doctrine of judicial estoppel); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Allfirst Bank. 282 F. Supp. 2d 339. 348 (D. Md. 2003) ('"Judicial estoppel does not 
require . . . a showing of detrimental reliance by the party asserting its protections.'") 
(citation omitted); Newfield Exploration Co. v. Applied Drilling Technology. Inc.. 2003 
WL 23253. at *6 (E.D. La. Jan. 2. 2003) ("'[Jjudicial estoppel may be applied even if 
detrimental reliance . . . does not exist.'") (citation omitted); Steinman v. Levine. 2002 
WL 31761252. at *11 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27. 2002) ("[M]ore recent Delaware cases cite the 
elements of judicial estoppel. . . [as] not requiring] detrimental reliance."); White v. 
Goth. 47 P.3d 550. 552 n.l (Or. Ct. App. 2002) ("[Jjudicial estoppel does not require 
detrimental reliance, a component that is essential for equitable estoppel.") (citing 
Hampton Tree Farms. Inc. v. Jewett. 892 P.2d 683 (Or. 1995)); Lott v. Sally Beauty Co.. 
2002 WL 533651. at *3 (M.D. Fla. March 5. 2002) (detrimental reliance not required; 
"[b]ecause the doctrine [judicial estoppel] aims to protect the court's interest, rather than 
any individual party's, it is not necessary . . . that the party against whom the inconsistent 
pleading is being used be specifically prejudiced by the inconsistency."); Montrose 
Medical Group v. Bulger. 243 F.3d 773. 779 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001) (detrimental reliance, 
while a prerequisite for application of equitable estoppel, is "not required for invocation 
of judicial estoppel."); International Billing Services. Inc. v. Emigh. 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
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Most courts, moreover, do not use, as a factor, whether the prior and current legal 
proceedings involve the same subject matter. The relevant factor they use is whether the 
position in the first proceeding contradicts the position in the second proceeding. See 
e.g.. New Hampshire. 532 U.S. 742 and authorities cited, supra, at fns. 9-10. 
C. Utah Courts Since Tracy Loan Have Indicated Utah Will 
Follow The Modern Rule On Judicial Estoppel. 
Since Tracy Loan was decided in 1942, Utah courts have quoted the language 
from Tracy Loan without explicitly re-examining whether that rule is appropriate in light 
of developments in the law of judicial estoppel and the policy behind that rule. There are 
three Utah cases, however, where the Court or members of the Court have indicated the 
rule should be liberalized along the lines of the modern rule. 
532. 542 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) ("Ordinarily 'equitable estoppel' entails detrimental 
reliance by one party, but 'judicial estoppel5 does not."); In the Matter of Coastal Plains. 
Inc.. 179 F.3d 197. 205 (5th Cir. 1999) ("Because [judicial estoppel] is intended to protect 
the judicial system, rather than the litigants, detrimental reliance by the opponent of the 
party against whom the doctrine is applied is not necessary.") (emphasis in original); 
Vowers and Sons. Inc. v. Strasheim. 576 N.W.2d 817. 824 (Neb. 1998) ("'[Jjudicial 
estoppel may be applied even if detrimental reliance . . . does not exist.5") (citation 
omitted); Tozzi v. Long Island R.R. Co.. 651 N.Y.S. 2d 270. 275 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) 
("[DJetrimental reliance is not a prerequisite to the applicability of judicial estoppel as the 
intent of said doctrine is not to protect the individual litigant, but to protect the integrity 
of the judicial system itself."); Johnson v. Du Page Airport Authority. 644 N.E.2d 802. 
807 (111. App. Ct. 1994) ("[Judicial estoppel] may be applied despite the lack of 
detrimental reliance"); State v. St. Cloud. 465 N.W.2d 177. 180 (S.D. 1991) ("Unlike 
collateral estoppel or equitable estoppel, judicial estoppel [does not require] detrimental 
reliance."); Teledyne Indus.. Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board. 911 F.2d 1214. 1220 
(6th Cir. 1990) ("Judicial estoppel may apply regardless of detrimental reliance by the 
opposing party because it exists to protect the integrity of the courts instead of the 
litigants."). 
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First, in International Resources v. Dunfield 599 P.2d 515 (Utah 1979). the Utah 
Supreme Court stated, with regard to the Tracy Loan rule, that it was aware: 
of a concededly overbroad statement in our case of Tracy Loan . . . to the 
effect that one would not be "judicially estopped" unless the parties and the 
issues are the same in the instant and the prior suit. Any misstatement of 
the rule was corrected and superseded by our decision in Richards v. 
Hodson. [485 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1971)]. 
Id. at 517 n.4. That language indicates the factors of "mutuality of the parties" and 
"same subject matters" may not be factors in a judicial estoppel analysis under Utah law. 
Cf. Masters v. Worslev. 777 P.2d 499. 504 TUT. App. 1989). 
Second, in Royal Resources v. Gibraltar Financial Corp., 603 P.2d 793 (Utah 
1979), Justice Maughn, in his dissent, addressed the doctrine of judicial estoppel. The 
majority had not addressed judicial estoppel, and Justice Maughan asserted judicial 
estoppel should have been the determinative principle. In discussing judicial estoppel, 
Justice Maughan stated that detrimental reliance may not be an element of judicial 
estoppel: 
The maxim "one cannot blow hot and cold, in the same breath" finds 
its expression in the doctrine of judicial estoppel. A litigant is not 
allowed to maintain inconsistent positions injudicial proceedings. 
Those elements such as reliance and injury or prejudice to the 
individual, which are generally essential to the operation of an 
equitable estoppel do not enter into a judicial estoppel or at least not 
to the same extent. 
603 P.2d at 797 & 798 n.7 (Maughan, J., dissenting). 
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Third, in Wiese v. Wiese. 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985), Justice Durham, in her 
dissent, also addressed the doctrine of judicial estoppel. The majority had decided the 
case under the doctrine of equitable estoppel and found there was no evidence of 
detrimental reliance. In her dissent, Justice Durham disagreed that equitable estoppel 
was the determinative issue and asserted that the case should have been decided on the 
basis of judicial estoppel. While quoting the Tracy Loan rule, Justice Durham stated that 
judicial estoppel, unlike equitable estoppel, did not require detrimental reliance: 
I believe, however, that the principle of judicial estoppel has a strong 
and independent policy justification, namely the need to uphold the 
sanctity of oaths and the integrity of the judicial process. Thus the 
requirement of prejudice to an adverse party which is part of the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel need not be imposed in the case of 
judicial estoppel. 
699 P.2d at 705 (Durham, J., dissenting)(emphasis added). 
n. JUDGE HANSON CONSIDERED THE APPROPRIATE FACTORS IN 
HIS JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL ANALYSIS. AND CORRECTLY 
CONCLUDED. BASED ON UNDISPUTED FACTS. THAT JUDICIAL 
ESTOPPEL APPLIED AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT MUST BE 
GRANTED AGAINST JOHNSON. 
A. Judge Hanson Correctly Concluded That Mutuality Of The 
Parties Is Not A Required Element Of Judicial Estoppel; That 
Conclusion. However. Was Not Determinative Of His 
Conclusion That Judicial Estoppel Applied. 
Judge Hanson concluded that, under Utah law, mutuality of the parties is not a 
requirement for application of judicial estoppel. [R. at 2626, f^ 2] Judge Hanson's 
conclusion was correct based on the recognized purpose for judicial estoppel, the modern 
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rule adopted by the overwhelming majority of courts, and the status of Utah law on the 
issue. See authorities cited, supra, at pp. 17-19. 
However, regardless of whether Judge Hanson was correct in his conclusion is not 
determinative of the correctness of his conclusion that judicial estoppel applied and 
summary judgment should be granted. Judge Hanson concluded that there was mutuality 
of the parties because the SB A and Orvis were in privity. [R. at 2626, f^ 3 ("Orvis, 
having purchased and having been assigned the judgment owned by the SB A, is in 
privity with the SB A.")] Under Utah law, an assignee of a judgment is in privity with the 
original owner of the judgment. See Searle Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689 (1978); 
Condas v. Condas. 618 P.2d 491 (1980); Kunz Co. v. State. 913 P.2d 765 (Ut. App. 
1996). 
The undisputed record - the only record - before Judge Hanson demonstrated 
Orvis was in privity with the SB A. Johnson admitted that Orvis purchased and was 
assigned the SB A judgment; he attached the assignment to his affidavit. [R. at 2280, fflf 
52, 60; R. at 2513] Johnson's admission, the written assignment and Orvis' Affidavit 
were the only record relative to whether Orvis was in privity with the SB A. 
Johnson's assertion, for the first time on appeal, that there were material issues of 
fact relative to whether Orvis was an assignee of the judgment is without merit. 
Johnson's new position is: (1) there was no assignment to Orvis because the judgment 
was purchased with funds Orvis wrongly took from the "alleged partnership" and (2) the 
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assignment is void because it was purchased by Orvis in violation of his fiduciary duties 
as an "alleged partner" of Johnson. [Johnson Br. at 12-15] Johnson's arguments are 
fallacious for three fundamental reasons. 
First, Johnson never raised this issue below and therefore waived it as an issue on 
appeal. In fact, he admitted that Orvis had been assigned the judgment. Blackner v. 
State Dept. of Transportation. 2002 UT 44. ^ 16. n.L 48 P.3d 949, 953 n.l; Paulos v. 
Covenant Transp.. 2004 UT. App. 35. % 10. 86 P.3d 752. 
Second, even if he had preserved the issue, there is no record to support Johnson's 
mere allegations and speculation that the "alleged partnership" funds were used to 
purchase the SB A judgment or that Orvis violated some "alleged partnership" fiduciary 
duty by purchasing the SB A judgment. Johnson certainly does not cite to any such 
record in his brief. [Johnson Br. at 13-15]n Nor does he cite to determinative legal 
authority. 
Utah law is clear that relevant issues of material fact cannot be created out of 
whole cloth - they cannot be based on the argument of counsel; they cannot be based on 
11
 Johnson's citation to and reliance on the deposition of Tommy Triplett [R. 855-
875] and Jade Griffin [R. at 877-884] is totally inappropriate, as well as irrelevant. 
[Johnson Br. at 14] Judge Hanson, in September 2002, struck those depositions from the 
record and prohibited any reference to them because of the "irregularities in how the 
depositions were conducted." [R. at 1439-1442] Johnson had taken the depositions in a 
case in Tennessee in which he was not counsel of record and which had already settled. 
He provided no notice of the depositions to Orvis, and Orvis did not attend the 
depositions. [Id.] The other deposition Johnson cites, Will Vigil's [R. at 2585-2588] 
simply does not provide any evidentiary support for Johnson's position. 
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conclusory or speculative allegations of a party; they certainly cannot be based on belated 
arguments on appeal with no record support. An issue of material fact can only be 
created by specific admissible facts. Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 
1983); Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747. 748 (Utah 1985) (".. . the affidavit of an 
adverse party must contain specific evidentiary facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial.5'); Dairy Products Services, Inc. v. City of Wellsville, 13 P.3d 581 (Utah 
2000) ("[A]n affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must set forth 
specific facts that would be admissible in evidence in order to show there is a genuine 
issue for trial. . . . An affidavit that merely reflects the affiant's unsubstantiated opinions 
and conclusions is insufficient to create an issue of fact." (citations omitted)); Winter v. 
Northwest Pipeline Corp.. 820 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1991) ("Allegations of a pleading or 
factual conclusions of an affidavit are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact."). 
Third, Judge Hanson's conclusion that judicial estoppel applied barred Johnson 
from using "purported evidence" of the alleged partnership to create an issue of fact. 
B. Judge Hanson Considered Each Of The Three Elements 
Johnson Asserted Were Required Elements For Judicial 
Estoppel And, Based On The Undisputed Facts Relative To 
Those Elements, Correctly Concluded Judicial Estoppel 
Applied And Summary Judgment Was Warranted. 
Johnson, in his opposition to Orvis' motion for summary judgment, affirmatively 
asserted judicial estoppel had three required elements: (1) the prior proceeding and 
current action must be between the same parties or their privies; (2) the prior proceeding 
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and current action must involve the same subject matter; and (3) the position in the prior 
proceeding must have been successfully maintained. [R. at 2262] Those were the only 
elements Johnson asserted were required. [Id.] 
On appeal, Johnson continues to assert that those three elements are required 
elements but, for the first time on appeal, now claims there are two additional required 
elements - (1) detrimental reliance on Johnson's prior SBA testimony and (2) Johnson's 
prior SBA testimony was in bad faith and not a mistake. [Johnson Br. at 5-6] These two 
newly asserted elements will be addressed in subsections C & D below. 
Johnson asserts on appeal that there were issues of material fact with regard to the 
three elements Johnson did assert below which prevented Judge Hanson from entering 
summary judgment. Johnson's argument is disingenuous and wholly without merit. 
1. Johnson's First Element - It Was Undisputed That Orvis Was In 
Privity With The SBA. 
The first Johnson element - mutuality of the parties - has already been fully 
addressed above at pp. 24-27. 
2. Johnson's Second Element - It Was Undisputed The SBA 
Proceeding Involved The Same Subject Matter; Johnson's Prior 
Sworn Testimony Contradicted His Position Here. 
The second Johnson element - same subject matters - has two aspects. First, if 
this court determines that judicial estoppel requires same subject matters in the prior and 
current action - which Orvis submits it should not - the appropriate prior proceeding to 
consider is the proceeding in which Johnson's SBA testimony was undisputably given. 
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The underlying action in which the SB A judgment was entered is not the proper prior 
proceeding to consider, contrary to Johnson's assertion, because that is not the judicial 
proceeding in which Johnson's SB A testimony was given. That proceeding is irrelevant 
for a subject matter determination. 
The undisputed facts demonstrate the subject matter in the SB A post-judgment 
supplemental proceeding is the same as the subject matter in this proceeding for purposes 
of judicial estoppel. It is undisputed that the purpose of the SB A supplemental 
proceeding was to identify assets Johnson had that would satisfy the judgment against 
Johnson. Those assets included any interest Johnson had in any partnership or LLC. 
That is why Johnson's deposition was taken and that is why the questions at his 
deposition were directed at identifying assets in which he might have an interest. Indeed, 
Judge Hanson characterized those proceedings as proceedings "for collection purposes." 
[R. at 2627, f 5] Likewise, the subject matter of this action is undisputed. This is an 
action to determine whether Johnson has as one of his assets a partnership interest in 
Orvis' businesses. [R. at 1-14, 20-39, 2624; Johnson Br. at vii] It strains credulity to 
argue the two subject matters are not the same for the purpose of judicial estoppel -
preventing litigants from using judicial proceedings to perpetrate wrongdoing. 
The real focus of Johnson's second element, however, is whether Johnson's 
testimony in the SBA proceeding contradicts his position here that he has a partnership 
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interest in Orvis' businesses. Judge Hanson, based on the undisputed facts, held that it 
did. [R. at 2624, 2625, 2627] 
Johnson's challenge to Judge Hanson's conclusion on the ground there were 
issues of material fact with regard to that question [Johnson Br. at 19-24] is made out of 
whole cloth. While Johnson argues that there is an extensive record demonstrating the 
question he was asked regarding partnerships was vague and ambiguous, and that he 
understood the partnership question to "involve real estate activities, and not to 
encompass the Orvis credit repair businesses...." [Johnson Br. at 19-22], Johnson does 
not cite to a single piece of evidence to support his position. For good reason; there is no 
record support. His only general reference to purported "substantial and extensive 
support" is his memorandum opposing the Orvis motion for summary judgment, 
Johnson's supporting affidavit, and his answer to the SBA's partnership question. 
[Johnson Br. at 20] Johnson's reliance on these three items is wholly misplaced; none of 
them created an issue of material fact relative to the question of contradiction. 
Johnson's legal memorandum, filed by his lawyer, in opposition to Orvis' motion 
is not evidence; it cannot create an issue of material fact. 
Johnson's affidavit not only does not support Johnson's position, it establishes 
that Johnson's SB A testimony contradicts his position in this case. Johnson's affidavit 
only addresses his SB A testimony at issue in one paragraph - paragraph 39 - of a 60 
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paragraph affidavit that is 16 pages in length. Johnson's only testimony in his affidavit 
regarding that SB A testimony is: 
In his deposition, Jamis Johnson accurately disclosed the information 
requested by the SB A. 
[R. at 2274] That is it. There is no testimony he didn't understand the question or 
thought the question was about real estate partnerships not a partnership interest in 
Orvis' businesses. In fact, the heading he uses in his affidavit for the SBA testimony 
demonstrates the SBA question and his answer included any partnership interest, not just 
real estate partnerships. In his affidavit, Johnson labeled the SBA testimony as testimony 
about "Interest in any partnerships - ". [R. at 2275 (emphasis added)] 
Johnson's argument that there was an issue of material fact because the SBA 
question is ambiguous is refuted by the question itself. The question the SBA asked 
Johnson was: 
Q. Do you have any interest in any partnerships? 
[R. at 2275] That question, on its face, is a clear, unambiguous question. It does not 
create an issue of material fact. 
Johnson's argument that his entire answer to that question created an issue of 
material fact again is wrong. Johnson's complete answer to the question "Do you have 
any interest in any partnerships" is: 
A. No. I mean you know, often I'll have a joint endeavor with 
somebody, but I don't have a partnership or set up a 
partnership or an LLC. You know, if I get a deal I say, Hey, 
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do you want to do this deal together? We'll go up to Summit 
County and buy a lot. 
Q. So a joint venture? 
A. Yeah, you can call it that, but I don't have any outgoing 
partnerships. 
[R. at 2275 (emphasis added)] His answer confirms his SBA testimony is contradictory. 
He denied he had any interest in any partnerships. 
Johnson's answer to the SBA's question whether Johnson had "[a]ny interest in 
any limited liability companies" is also a categorical denial. 
A. No. I had an interest in a limited liability company in 
California called Simmons Shores, LLC. The property got 
foreclosed out from underneath it. I made some money from 
raising loans for it, but that no longer exists. I had an interest 
in an outfit called Western Equities, LLC, but that is no longer 
functional. I have no interest in LLCs or corporations. 
[R. at 2275 (emphasis added)] 
3. Johnson's Third Element - It Was Undisputed Johnson 
Successfully Maintained His Prior Position In The SBA 
Proceeding That He Had No Interest In Any Partnerships. 
The record, as stated by Judge Hanson, undisputably demonstrated that Johnson 
successfully maintained his sworn denial that he had any interest in any partnerships or 
any other assets. The SBA never collected its judgment against Johnson and ultimately 
sold it for a fraction of its face value. [R. at 2271, ^ 25; R. at 2280, f 52; R. at 2282 f 60; 
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R. at 2381, 2513; R. at 2627, ffif 4-5; R. at 2627, ffif 6-7] There is no evidence to the 
contrary. 
C. Johnson Waived As An Issue On Appeal Whether An 
Essential Element Of Judicial Estoppel Is That The Prior 
Position Was Not A Mistake; In Any Event, The Undisputed 
Facts Demonstrated It Was Not A Mistake. 
Johnson, for the first time on appeal, raises the issue of whether lack of mistake -
inadvertence - was an essential element of judicial estoppel. [Johnson Br. at vi] 
Johnson never raised that issue before Judge Hanson. In fact, Johnson asserted below 
that there were only three essential elements of judicial estoppel, none of which was lack 
of mistake. [R. at 2262]12 Johnson, therefore, has waived that issue as a basis for appeal. 
Blackner. 2002 UT 44, If 16. n.L 48 P.3d at 953 n.l; Paulos. 2004 UT App. 35. % 10. 86 
P.3d 752. 
Even if he had preserved the issue, it would make no difference. Judge Hanson 
considered that factor, and it was undisputed, as stated by Judge Hanson, that: "There 
was no question of mistake. Johnson testified as he did so as to avoid collection efforts 
12
 Johnson knows he did not preserve this issue below. The only cite he has for 
his assertion that he preserved the issue below is a cite to the page of his legal 
memorandum where he states there are only three elements, none of which is mistake. 
[Johnson Br. at vi] 
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from the Small Business Administration." [R. at 2620]I3 There was no evidence of 
mistake. 
It was undisputed Johnson was a lawyer at the time he was deposed. He knew the 
purpose for his deposition being taken by the SBA. He knew the SBA would execute 
upon any asset, including any partnership interest in Orvis' businesses, he disclosed in 
his deposition to satisfy the judgment against him. The question the SBA asked him 
about partnerships was clear and unambiguous - "Do you have any interest in any 
partnerships." [R. at 1983] Johnson answered that question under oath with an 
unequivocal "No." [Id.] Johnson never asked to have the question clarified and never 
changed his testimony during the deposition or after his testimony was transcribed. In 
his affidavit in opposition to Orvis' motion, Johnson admitted his testimony was 
"accurate," and that he understood the question to include interests he had in any 
partnerships - "Interests in any partnerships", SBA deposition testimony at "P.30 lines 
16-25 and P.31 lines 1-24." [R. at 2275 (emphasis added)] 
Johnson now in this case wants to contradict his prior sworn testimony for his 
own economic benefit. He wants to use the judicial system to perpetrate a fraud. 
13
 3D Construction and Development v. Old Standard Life Insurance Co.. 2005 
UT. App. 307. H 12, 117 P.3d 1082. 1086, requires nothing further to uphold Judge 
Hanson's decision. It should be noted, moreover, that the Court's statement that the 
Tenth Circuit does not recognize the doctrine of judicial estoppel is no longer true. 
Johnson v. Lindon City Corp.. 405 F.3d 1065 (lOtfa Cir. 2005V 
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Johnson either lied in the SB A proceeding for his own economic benefit or he is lying to 
Judge Hanson for his own economic benefit. 
D. Johnson Did Not Raise And Therefore Waived As An Issue 
On Appeal Whether Detrimental Reliance Is An Essential 
Element of Judicial Estoppel; In Any Event, The Undisputed 
Record Demonstrated The SB A Relied On Johnson's SB A 
Testimony To Its Detriment. 
Johnson, for the first time on appeal, raises as an issue that detrimental reliance is 
an essential element of judicial estoppel under Utah law. [Johnson Br. at vi]14 Johnson 
has waived that issue as a basis for appeal. Blackner, 2004 UT. 44, ^ 16 n.l; Paulos, 
2004 UT.App. 35,^10. 
In any event, the undisputed evidence demonstrated the SB A detrimentally relied 
on Johnson's sworn denial he had no interest in any partnerships. It is undisputed the 
SB A never collected on its judgment and eventually sold it for a fraction of its face 
value. 
E. Even Though Under A De Novo Review, Judge Hanson's 
Decision And The Final Judgment Must Be Affirmed, The 
Appropriate Standard For Reviewing Judge Hanson's 
Conclusion That Judicial Estoppel Applied Is An Abuse Of 
Discretion Standard. 
It does not matter whether the Court reviews Judge Hanson's conclusion that 
judicial estoppel applied under de novo review or under an abuse of discretion standard. 
14
 Again, Johnson's record cite for preservation of this issue is to his opposing 
memorandum where he states there are three required elements, none of which is 
detrimental reliance. [Johnson Br. at vi; R. at 2262] 
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However, the proper standard for review is the abuse of discretion standard, even though 
this appeal is from Judge Hanson's grant of summary judgment. 
While Utah appellate courts have never addressed the proper standard of review in 
a case such as this one, other appellate courts which have squarely addressed the issue 
apply an abuse of discretion standard of review to a trial court's application of judicial 
estoppel, even within the context of a grant of summary judgment.15 Alternative Sys. 
Concepts, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., 374 F.3d 23, 30-32 (1st Cir. 2004); accord Nat. Union. 
Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg v. Mfrs. and Traders Trust Co., 137 Fed. Appx. 529, 530 (4th 
Cir. 2005); In re West Delta Oil Co., 66 Fed. Appx. 524 (5th Cir. 2003): De Leon v. 
Comcar Indus., Inc., 321 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003); Hamilton v. State Farm Fire 
& Casualty Co., 270 F.3d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 2001); Ahrens v. Perot Svs. Corp., 205 F.3d 
831, 833 (5th Cir. 2000); Barack Ferrazzano Kirschbaum Perlman & Nagelberg v. 
Loffredi, 795 N.E.2d 779, 783-84, 789-90 (111. Ct. App. 2003): Otis v. Arbella Mut. Ins. 
Co., 824 N.E.2d 23, 29 (Mass. 2005); Garrett v. Morgan, 112 P.3d 531, 533 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2005). 
15An abuse of discretion standard of review is appropriate relative to the trial 
court's application of judicial estoppel because "'judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine 
invoked by a court at its discretion/" application of the doctrine draws upon the trial 
court's intimate knowledge of the case, and the amorphous nature of the doctrine requires 
a flexible standard. Alternative Sys. Concepts, 374 F.3d at 30-31 (quoting New 
Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001)). 
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More specifically, in an appeal arising from the grant of summary judgment on the 
basis of judicial estoppel, these courts apply a two-tiered standard of review. First, the 
appellate court determines whether the trial court abused its discretion in applying 
judicial estoppel. Barack, 795 N.E.2d at 789-90. After making this determination, the 
court then reviews de novo the grant of summary judgment. Id. If the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in applying judicial estoppel, then the non-moving party is "judicially 
estopped from attempting to create a question of fact for purposes of summary judgment 
by contradicting their previous positions," and summary judgment is appropriate. Id.; 
Alternative Svs. Concepts. 374 F.3d at 31-32.16 
As a result, Johnson's argument that there were disputed material facts relative to 
the judicial estoppel factors is inapposite. The question is not whether there were 
disputed facts relative to the factors utilized for application of judicial estoppel. Rather, 
the question is whether, if Judge Hanson did not abuse his discretion in applying judicial 
estoppel to prevent Johnson from presenting any evidence of a partnership, were there 
any remaining material issues of disputed fact. Ultimately, if there were no remaining 
material issues of disputed fact, Judge Hanson's grant of summary judgment was correct 
as a matter of law. 
16Under Utah law, a trial court's decision to exclude evidence for purposes of a 
motion for summary judgment is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Alder v. Bayer 
Corp.. 2002 UT 115^ 20, 61 P-3d 1068. 1075-76: Murdock v. Springville Mun. Corp. 
(In re General Determination of the Rights to the Use of All the Water). 982 P.2d 65, 71-
72 (Utah 1999). 
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III. JOHNSON WAIVED. AS A BASIS FOR APPEAL, HIS ASSERTION 
THAT JUDGE HANSON WAS BIASED; IN ANY EVENT. THERE IS 
NO EVIDENCE OF JUDICIAL BIAS. 
Johnson asserts, for the first time on appeal, that the Judgment should be reversed 
because Judge Hanson was biased against Johnson. [Johnson Br. at vi] Johnson admits 
he did not raise that issue below. [Id,; 22-32] 
The law in Utah is clear that Utah courts will not consider an allegation of judicial 
bias raised for the first time on appeal. Utah Rule Civ. P. 63(b); Campbell Maack & 
Sessions v. Debrv. 2001 UT. App. 397. f 24. 38 P.3d 984; Wade v. Stangl 869 P.2d 9. 
11 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("We will not, therefore, consider the issue of judicial bias or 
prejudice when raised for the first time on appeal.")-
Moreover, Johnson's assertion that Judge Hanson was biased against him because 
Judge Hanson oversaw Johnson's disbarment proceedings is not supported by any 
record.17 Judicial bias is a serious charge, and one that should not be leveled lightly and 
with absolutely no evidence to substantiate it. See State v. State. 965 P.2d 55 L 556 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("Utah cases have consistently required that the bias alleged . . . 
'have some basis in fact and be grounded on more than mere conjecture and 
17
 Johnson points as "evidence" that Judge Hanson was biased is the fact Judge 
Hanson ruled against him. But judicial bias cannot be based on a judge ruling against a 
party. If that were so, every litigant who lost a case could raise judicial bias on appeal as 
a basis for reversal. See State. 956 P.2d at 556 ("[N]o deduction of bias and prejudice 
may be made from adverse rulings by a judge.'") (citation omitted). 
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speculation/" (quoting Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan, 767 P.2d 538. 544 n.5 
(Utah 1998)). 
Indeed, Rule 63(b) of the Utah R. Civ. P. requires that, when a party seeks the 
disqualification of a judge, that party must file a motion for disqualification and a 
supporting affidavit "stating facts sufficient to show bias, prejudice or conflict of 
interest." Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b)(1)(A). The motion and affidavit must be filed no later 
than twenty days after a party or his attorney enters their appearance or they learn or with 
the exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of the grounds upon which the 
motion is based. Id Johnson never filed any such motion or affidavit because there was 
no basis for doing so. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should affirm Judge Hanson's decision that judicial estoppel applies 
and the Judgement entered by Judge Hanson on November 23, 2004. 
DATED: December 2, 2005. 
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